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Abstract
A central problem in the field of causal modelling is to provide a suitable definition of actual causation, i.e., to
define when one specific event caused another. Although current research contains many different definitions, it
is pervaded with ambiguities and confusion. Our research has two main goals. First, we wish to provide a clear
way to compare competing definitions, and improve upon them so that they can be applied to a more diverse range
of instances, including non-deterministic ones. To achieve this we provide a general, abstract definition of actual
causation, formulated in the context of the expressive language of CP-logic (Causal Probabilistic logic). We will then
show that three recent definitions by Ned Hall (originally formulated for structural models) and a definition of our own
(formulated for CP-logic directly) can be viewed and directly compared as instantiations of this abstract definition,
which also allows them to deal with a broader range of examples. Second, our framework allows for improving
on definitions of actual causation in another way, by incorporating the influence of normality. A recent paper by
Halpern and Hitchcock draws on empirical research regarding people’s causal judgments, to suggest a graded and
context-sensitive notion of actual causation. We rephrase their approach into the probabilistic setting of our abstract
definition, allowing us to improve it.
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1. Introduction
Suppose we know the causal laws that govern some domain, and that we then observe a story that takes place
in this domain; when should we now say that, in this particular story, one event caused another? Ever since Lewis
(1973) first analyzed this problem of actual causation (a.k.a. token causation) in terms of counterfactual dependence,
philosophers and researchers from the AI community alike have been trying to improve on his attempt. The literature
now contains many definitions of actual causation, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The fact that the
formulations of these different definitions diverges widely, proves a major obstacle for evaluating and comparing
them. A second problem is posed by the standard practice of assuming that questions of causation can be separated
from their field of application, because this conflicts with recent research that suggest actual causation is a strongly
context-dependent concept. In this paper we address both issues, by presenting a formal framework for expressing
definitions and extensions of actual causation.
Following Pearl (2000), structural equations have become a popular formal language for defining actual causation
(Woodward, 2003; Hitchcock, 2007, 2009; Halpern and Pearl, 2005a; Weslake, 2015; Halpern, 2015). A notable
exception is the work of Ned Hall, who has extensively critiziced the privileged role of structural equations for causal
modelling, as well as the definitions that have been expressed with it. He has proposed several definitions himself (Hall
and Paul, 2003; Hall, 2004, 2007), the latest of which is a sophisticated attempt to overcome the flaws he observes in
those that rely too heavily on structural equations. We have developed a definition of our own (Beckers and Vennekens,
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2012; Vennekens, 2011), within the language of CP-logic (Causal Probabilistic logic). CP-logic (Vennekens et al.,
2009) is a probabilistic logic programming language, based on Sato’s distribution semantics (Sato, 1995).
The relation between these different approaches is currently not well understood. Indeed, they are all expressed
using different formalisms (e.g., neuron diagrams, structural equations, CP-logic, or just natural language). Therefore,
comparisons between them are limited to verifying on which examples they (dis)agree. Our first goal in this paper is
to work towards a remedy for this situation. We will present a general, parametrized, and probabilistic definition of
actual causation.
We will develop this framework in the context of CP-logic, because this language offers all the features that are
required to define the necessary concepts in a straightforward and natural way. In particular, we make use of the fact
that CP-logic has a modular rule-based structure and a semantics that is explicitly temporal and makes a distinction
between the default and deviant values of variables. In the context of structural models, which lack these features, our
general framework would be significantly more cumbersome to define.
Exploiting the fact that neuron diagrams and structural equations – at least those typically used in the actual
causation literature – can be reduced to CP-logic, we will then show that our definition and three definitions by Ned
Hall can be seen as particular instantiations of this parametrized definition. Our analysis thus allows for a formal
and fundamental comparison between these approaches, which is a first step towards an improved account. Also, it
generalises the definitions by Hall from a deterministic to a non-deterministic setting. Still, all of these definitions
share one feature: they do not take into account the context in which the question of actual causation is posed.
In their forthcoming article Graded Causation and Defaults, Halpern and Hitchcock – HH – quite rightly observe
that not only is there a vast amount of disagreement regarding actual causation in the literature, but there is also a
growing number of empirical studies which show that people’s intuitions are influenced to a large degree by contextual
factors which up to now have been ignored when dealing with causation. For example, our judgments on two similarly
modelled cases may differ depending on whether it takes place in a moral context or a purely mechanical one, or
on what we take to be the default setting, or on whether we take something to be a background condition or not,
etc. (Knobe and Fraser, 2008; Moore, 2009; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009). This has led HH to develop a flexible
framework that allows room for incorporating different judgments on actual causation. More specifically, in their
view the difference between cases that are modelled using similar structural models depends on which worlds we take
to be more normal than others in the different contexts. Therefore their solution is to extend structural models with a
normality ranking on worlds, and use it to adapt and order our judgments of actual causation in a manner suited for
the particular context.
We sympathize with many of their observations, and we agree that normality considerations do influence our
causal judgments. However, we find their representation of normality lacking for three reasons. First, although they
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between statistical and normative normality, they use a single ranking
for both. Second, they refrain from using probabilities to represent statistical normality, and instead work with a
partial preorder over worlds. Third, although they stress the generality of their approach, they develop it solely for
the HP-definition of actual causation (Halpern and Pearl, 2005a). The second goal of this paper is to use the general,
parametrized definition of actual causation, to improve upon the extension to actual causation offered by HH. Using
CP-logic, we are able to represent statistical normality in the usual way, i.e., by means of probabilities. As we
will show, such a quantitative representation of statistical normality avoids a number of problems that HH’s ordinal
representation runs into. To cope with normative normality, we introduce a separate notion of norms. The result will
be a more generally applicable and yet simpler approach.
We first introduce the CP-logic language in Section 2. In Section 3, a general definition of actual causation is first
presented, and then instantiated into four concrete definitions. Section 4 offers a succinct representation of all these
definitions, and an illustration of how they compare to each other. The following section presents the extension to
actual causation by HH. We translate their work into the CP-logic language in Section 6. Section 7 contains a first
improvement to this translation, followed by some examples and our final extension to actual causation in Section 8.
Part of this work was presented at the Probabilistic Logic Programming workshop (Beckers and Vennekens,
2015b) and at the Commonsense Reasoning Symposium (Beckers and Vennekens, 2015a).
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2. CP-logic
We give a short, informal introduction to CP-logic. A detailed description can be found in (Vennekens et al., 2009,
2010). The basic syntactical unit of CP-logic is a CP-law, which takes the general form Head← Body. The body can
in general consist of any first-order logic formula. However, in this paper, we restrict our attention to conjunctions
of ground literals. The head contains a disjunction of atoms annotated with probabilities, representing the possible
effects of this law. When the probabilities in a head do not add up to one, we implicitly assume an empty disjunct,
annotated with the remaining probability.
Each CP-law models a specific causal mechanism. Informally, if the Body of the law is satisfied, then at some
point it will be applied, meaning one of the disjuncts in the Head is chosen, each with their respective probabilities.
If a disjunct is chosen containing an atom that is not yet true, then this law causes it to become true; otherwise, the
law has no effect. A finite set of such CP-laws forms a CP-theory, and represents the causal structure of the domain
at hand. The domain unfolds by laws being applied one after another, where multiple orders are often possible, and
each law is applied at most once. We illustrate with an example from (Hall, 2004):
Example 1. Suzy and Billy each decide to throw a rock at a bottle. When Suzy does so, her rock shatters the bottle
with probability 0.9. Billy’s aim is slightly worse and he only hits with probability 0.8.
This small causal domain can be expressed by the following CP-theory T :
T hrows(Suzy)← . (1)
T hrows(Billy)← . (2)
(Breaks : 0.9)← T hrows(Suzy). (3)
(Breaks : 0.8)← T hrows(Billy). (4)
The first two laws are vacuous (i.e., they will be applied in every story) and deterministic (i.e., they have only one
possible outcome, where we leave implicit the probability 1). The last two laws are non-deterministic, causing either
the bottle to break or nothing at all.
The given theory summarizes all possible stories that can take place in this model. For example, it allows for the
story consisting of the following chain of events:
Example 2. Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. However
Billy’s throw was also accurate, and would have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.
To formalize this idea, the semantics of CP-logic uses probability trees (Shafer, 1996). For this example, one such
tree is shown in Figure 1. Here, each node represents a state of the domain, which is characterized by an assignment
of truth values to the atomic formulas, in this case T hrows(Suzy), T hrows(Billy) and Breaks. In the initial state of
the domain (the root node), all atoms are assigned their default value false. In this example, the bottle is initially
unbroken and the rocks are still in Billy and Suzy’s hands. The children of a node x are the result of the application
of a law: each edge (x,y) corresponds to a specific disjunct that was chosen from the head of the law that was applied
in node x. In this particular case, law (1) is applied first, so the assignment in the child-node is obtained by setting
T hrows(Suzy) to true, its deviant value. The third state has two child-nodes, corresponding to law (3) being applied
and either breaking the bottle (left child) or not (right child). The leftmost branch is thus the formal counterpart of
the above story, where the last edge represents the fact that Billy’s throw was also accurate, even though there was no
bottle left to break. A branch ends when no more laws can be applied.
A probability tree of a theory T in CP-logic defines an a priori probability distribution PT over all things that
might happen in this domain, which can be read off the leaf nodes of the branches by multiplying the probabilities on
the edges. For instance, the probability of the bottle breaking is the sum of the probabilities of the leaves in which
Breaks is true – the white circles in Figure 1 – giving 0.98. We have shown here only one such probability tree, but
we can construct others as well by applying the laws in different orders.
An important property however is that all trees defined by the same theory result in the same probability distribu-
tion. To ensure that this property holds even when there are bodies containing negative literals, CP-logic makes use of
the well-founded semantics. Simply put, this means the condition for a law to be applied in a node is not merely that
its body is currently satisfied, but that it will remain so. This implies that a negated atom in a body should not only
be currently assigned false, but actually has to have become impossible, so that it will remain false through to the
end-state. For atoms currently assigned true, it always holds that they remain true, hence here there is no problem.
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Figure 1: Probability tree for Suzy and Billy.
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Figure 2: Second probability tree for Suzy and Billy.
The order by which events happen in a causal story, such as Example 2, is represented by the order that laws are
applied in a branch. Therefore if the example were slightly different, so that Billy’s rock actually hit the bottle first,
then the formal counterpart of the story would be the leftmost branch of the probability tree depicted in Figure 2.
(Note that if we were to reverse the order of the first two edges, then this would represent the story where Suzy throws
before Billy, but Billy throws harder and thus his rock still reaches the bottle first.)
Probability trees do not allow for simultaneous events: at every moment only one event can happen. Although this
is a realistic assumption when considering a continuous time-scale, the granularity of the variables of interest in typical
examples is usually closer to a coarser, discrete division of time. More concretely, we can easily imagine a variant of
the story so that we can’t distinguish which rock hits the bottle first. In that case it makes perfect sense to assume that
for all intents and purposes both rocks hit the bottle simultaneously, making it a case of symmetric overdetermination.
To accommodate this possibility we take such a story to correspond to two branches rather than one, and shall say
that C causes E if this holds in either one of the branches considered by themselves.2 These branches consist of the
same nodes, ordered differently (eg., the leftmost branches of the trees in Figures 1 and 2 together represent the story
in which Suzy’s and Billy’s rocks hit the bottle at the same time). For matters of simplicity, throughout this paper we
shall assume there is no symmetric overdetermination and a story takes the form of a single branch.
2We choose to define causation for these cases in this manner because it agrees with the majority verdict in the literature that both overdeter-
mining events are causes. However one could also define it so that there has to be causation in both branches. In this case, neither event would be
considered a cause. If there are more than two simultaneous events, we generalize this reasoning in the straightforward way.
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2.1. Counterfactual Probabilities
In the context of structural equations, Pearl (2000) studies counterfactuals and shows how they can be evaluated
by means of a syntactic transformation. In their study of actual causation and explanations, Halpern and Pearl (2005b,
p. 27) also define counterfactual probabilities (i.e., the probability that some event would have had in a counterfactual
situation). Vennekens et al. (2010) present an equivalent method for evaluating counterfactual probabilities in CP-
logic, also making use of syntactic transformations.
Assume we have a branch b of a probability tree of some theory T . To make T deterministic in accordance with
the choices made in b, we transform T into T b by replacing the heads of the laws that were applied in b with the
disjuncts that were chosen from those heads in b. For example, if we take as branch b the story from Example 2, then
T b would be:
T hrows(Suzy)← .
T hrows(Billy)← .
Breaks← T hrows(Suzy).
Breaks← T hrows(Billy).
We will use Pearl’s do()-operator to indicate an intervention (Pearl, 2000). The intervention on a theory T that
ensures variable C remains false, denoted by do(¬C), removes C from the head of any law in which it occurs, yielding
T |do(¬C). For example, to prevent Suzy from throwing, the resulting theory T |do(¬T hrows(Suzy)) is given by:
← .
T hrows(Billy)← .
(Breaks : 0.9)← T hrows(Suzy).
(Breaks : 0.8)← T hrows(Billy).
Laws with an empty head are ineffective, and can thus simply be omitted. The analogous operation do(C) on a
theory T corresponds to adding the deterministic law C←.
With this in hand, we can now evaluate a Pearl-style counterfactual probability “given that b in fact occurred, the
probability that ¬E would have occurred if ¬C had been the case” as PT b(¬E|do(¬C)).3
3. Defining Actual Causation Using CP-logic
We now formulate a general, parametrized definition of actual causation, which can accommodate several concrete
definitions by filling in details that we first leave open. We demonstrate this using definitions by Hall and one by
ourselves. For the rest of the paper, we assume that we are given a CP-theory T and an actual story b in which both C
and E occurred, and that we are interested in whether or not C caused E.4 By Con we denote the quadruple (T,b,C,E),
and refer to this as a context.
3.1. Actual Causation in General
For reasons of simplicity, the majority of approaches (including Hall) only consider actual causation in a deter-
ministic setting. Further, it is taken for granted that the actual values of all variables are given. In such a context,
counterfactual dependence of the event E on C is expressed by the conditional: if do(¬C) then ¬E, where it is as-
sumed that all exogenous variables take on their actual values. In our probabilistic setting, the latter translates into
making those laws that were actually applied deterministic, in accordance with the choices made in the story. How-
ever, in many examples, the story does not specify the actual value of all exogenous variables. For example, if Suzy
is prevented from throwing her rock, then we cannot say what the accuracy would have been had she done so. In CP-
logic, this would be represented by the fact that law (3) is not applied. Hence, in a more general setting, it is required
only that do(¬C) makes ¬E possible. In other words, we get a probabilistic definition of counterfactual dependence:
Definition 1 (Dependence). E is counterfactually dependent on C in (T,b) iff PT b(¬E | do(¬C))> 0.
3Fenton-Glynn (2015) uses such counterfactual probabilities to extend the definition of causation from Halpern and Pearl (2005a) to probabilistic
structural equations. His focus lies with incorporating the idea that causes are “probability-raising” with regards to their effect, into a counterfactual
account. In this manner, two traditional approaches to actual causation are combined. This project stands somewhat orthogonal to our current
investigation. In future work it would be interesting to see how his results can be integrated into our framework.
4We hereby limit ourselves to causation between literals C and E, but our account can be generalised to include complex causes and effects as
well.
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As counterfactual dependency lies at the heart of causation for all of the approaches we are considering, Depen-
dence represents the most straightforward definition of actual causation.5 It is however too crude and allows for many
counterexamples, preemption being the most famous.
More refined definitions agree with the general structure of the former, but modify the theory T in more subtle
ways than T b does. We identify two different kinds of laws in T , that should each be treated in a specific way.
The first are the laws that are intrinsic with respect to the given context. These are laws whose outcome is fixed,
in the sense that in any counterfactual story we might consider, they will always produce the same outcome as they
did in the actual story. Thus, intrinsic laws should be made deterministic in accordance with b.
The second are laws that are irrelevant in the given context. These are laws that played no part in the causal
process that caused E, and that we should therefore not take into account when trying to find out if C was a cause of
E or not. Thus, irrelevant laws should simply be ignored.
Together, the methods of determining which laws are intrinsic and irrelevant, respectively, will be the parameters
of our general definition. Suppose we are given two functions Int and Irr, which both map each context (T,b,C,E)
to a subset of the theory T . With these, we define actual causation as follows:
Definition 2 (Actual causation given Int and Irr). Given the context Con, we define that C is an actual cause of E if
and only if E is counterfactually dependent on C when replacing T b with the theory T ∗ that we construct as:
T ∗ = [T \ (Irr(Con)∪ Int(Con))]∪ Int(Con)b.
For instance, the naive approach that identifies actual causation with counterfactual dependence corresponds to
taking Irr as the constant function {} and Int(Con) as {r ∈ T | r was applied in b}. From now on, we use the following,
more legible notation for a particular instantiation of this definition:
Dependence-Irr. No law r is irrelevant.
Dependence-Intr. A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
The following straightforward theorem expresses that this formulation of dependence is equivalent to the original
in Definition 1.
Theorem 1. Given the context Con, C is an actual cause of E given Dependence-Irr and Dependence-Intr iff E is
counterfactually dependent on C.
If desired, we can order different causes by their respective counterfactual probabilities PT ∗(¬E | do(¬C)), as
this indicates how important the cause was for E. Note however that Definition 1 reduces to a standard deterministic
definition of counterfactual dependence if all CP-laws are deterministic. In that case, our general Definition 2 becomes
deterministic as well.
3.2. Beckers and Vennekens 2012 Definition
A recent proposal by the current authors for a definition of actual causation was originally formulated in (Ven-
nekens, 2011), and later slightly modified in (Beckers and Vennekens, 2012). Here, we summarize the basic ideas of
the latter, and refer to it as BV12. We reformulate this definition in order to fit into our framework of Definition 2. It
is easily verified that both versions are equivalent.
Because we want to follow the actual story as closely as possible, the condition for intrinsicness is exactly like
before: we force all laws that were applied in b to have the same effect as they had in b.
To decide which laws were relevant for causing E in our story, we start from a simple temporal criterion: every law
that was applied after the effect E took place is irrelevant, and every law that was applied before isn’t. For example,
to figure out why the bottle broke in our previous example, law (4) is considered irrelevant, because the bottle was
already broken by the time Billy’s rock arrived. For laws that were not applied in b, we distinguish laws that could
still be applied when E occurred, from those that could not. The first are considered irrelevant, whereas the second
aren’t. This ensures that any story b′ that is identical to b up to and including the occurrence of E provides the same
judgements about the causes of E, since any law that is not applied in b but is applied in b′, must obviously occur after
E.
5This definition is similar in spirit to that of a partial explanation given in (Halpern and Pearl, 2005b). There the probability measures the
goodness of the explanation, here it measures the importance of the cause.
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BV12-Irrelevant. A law r is irrelevant iff r was not applied before E in b, although it could have. (I.e., it was not
impossible at the time when E occurred.)
BV12-Intrinsic. A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
The following theorem expresses that the current formulation is equivalent to the original definition.
Theorem 2. Given the context Con, C is an actual cause of E given BV12-Irr and BV12-Intr iff C is an actual cause
of E as defined in (Beckers and Vennekens, 2012).
3.3. Hall 2007
One of the currently most refined concepts of actual causation is that of Hall (2007). Although Hall uses structural
equations as a practical tool, he is of the opinion that intuitions about actual causation are best illustrated using neuron
diagrams. A key advantage of these diagrams, which they share with CP-logic, is that they distinguish between
the default and deviant state of a variable. Proponents of structural equations, on the other hand, countered Hall’s
approach by criticizing neuron diagrams’ limited expressivity (Hitchcock, 2009, p. 398). Indeed, a neuron diagram,
and thus Hall’s approach as well, is very limited in the kind of examples it can express. In particular, neuron diagrams
can only express deterministic causal relations, and they lack the ability to directly express causation by omission,
i.e., that the absence of C by itself causes E, as in the law E ←¬C. Hall’s solution is to argue against causation by
omission altogether. By contrast, we will offer an improvement of Hall’s account that generalizes to a probabilistic
context, and can also handle direct causation by omission.
3.3.1. Neuron Diagrams, Structural Equations, and CP-logic
In a standard neuron diagram, a neuron can be in one of two states, the default “off” state and the deviant “on”
state in which the neuron “fires”. Different kinds of links define how the state of one node affects the other. For
instance, in Diagram 1, E fires iff at least one of B or D fires, D fires iff C fires, and B fires iff A fires and C doesn’t
fire. Nodes that are “on” are represented by full circles and nodes that are “off” are shown as empty circles.
A
C D
EB
Figure 3: Diagram 1
C D
EA B
Figure 4: Diagrams 2
Diagrams 1 and 2 represent the same causal structure, but different stories: in both cases there are two causal chains
leading to E, one starting with C and another starting with A. But in Diagram 1 the chain through B is preempted by
C, whereas in Diagram 2 there is nothing for C to preempt, as A doesn’t even fire. Therefore the first is an example of
what is generally known as Early Preemption, whereas the second is not.
Although Hall presents his arguments using neuron diagrams, his definition is formulated in terms of structural
equations that correspond to such diagrams in the following way: for each endogenous variable there is one equation,
which contains a propositional formula on the right-hand side concisely expressing the dependencies of the diagram.
The left-most neurons, which have no incoming edges, are determined directly by the exogenous variables U that
represent the background conditions. For example, the structural equations for Diagrams 1 and 2 are:
A :=U1.
C :=U2.
B := A∧¬C.
D :=C.
E := B∨D.
A formal description of structural equations can be found in (Pearl, 2000). In general, structural equations al-
low functional dependencies between continuous variables, or discrete variables with possibly an infinite domain.
However, the actual causation literature typically considers only examples made up of discrete variables with a finite
domain, and propositional formulas. Further, in the majority of cases the variables are boolean. Therefore, in this
article, we restrict attention to those kinds of models. (We point out that CP-logic can also be generalised to include
discrete variables with a finite domain as well.) We can translate such a structural model into an equivalent CP-logic
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theory by simply replacing the “:=” symbol by “←”, and replacing the exogenous variables by non-determinism in
the laws (Vennekens et al., 2009).
CP-logic allows representations of causal relations that are more refined than those of structural models in two
ways. First, cyclic causal relations can be represented in a more correct way than considered in, e.g., Pearl (2000)
— for a discussion of this, see Vennekens et al. (2010)[Section 5]. Second, CP-logic also takes a modular approach
to representing causal mechanisms: rather than having a single CP-law that combines all direct causes of a variable,
CP-logic splits up independent mechanisms into separate CP-laws (Vennekens et al., 2010). Analogously, we translate
a single structural equation into a set of independent causal mechanisms. The same applies to neuron diagrams, which
is why CP-logic splits up the influence of B and D on E into two separate laws, similar to the influence of Billy and
Suzy on the bottle shattering in Example 1. Concretely, the translation of the causal model from Diagrams 1 and 2
into CP-logic is given by the following CP-theory – where p and q represent some probabilities:
(A : p)← .
(C : q)← .
B← A∧¬C.
D←C.
E← B.
E← D.
The state of the neuron diagram (i.e., which variables fire and which do not) corresponds to an assignment v of
values to the boolean variables V of the corresponding structural equations model M, which in turn corresponds to an
interpretation for a vocabulary of the corresponding CP-logic theory. With such a state, we therefore associate the set
of all branches of probability trees of the CP-logic theory whose leaf nodes contain this interpretation. Since we stick
to cases that do not involve symmetric overdetermination, we can choose a single branch b out of this set to represent
a story in a concise fashion.
3.3.2. Hall’s Definition
The idea behind Hall’s definition is to check for counterfactual dependence in situations which are reductions
of the actual situation, where a reduction is understood as “a variant of this situation in which strictly fewer events
occur”. In other words, because the counterfactual dependence of E on C can be masked by the occurrence of events
which are extrinsic to the actual causal process, we look at all possible scenario’s in which there are less of these
extrinsic events. Hall puts it like this (2007)[p. 129]:
Suppose we have a causal model for some situation. The model consists of some equations, plus a
specification of the actual values of the variables. Those values tell us how the situation actually unfolds.
But the same system of equations can also represent nomologically possible variants: just change the
values of one or more exogenous variables, and update the rest in accordance with the equations. A good
model will thus be able to represent a range of variations on the actual situation. Some of these variations
will be – or more accurately, will be modeled as – reductions of the actual situation, in that every variable
will either have its actual value or its default value. Suppose the model has variables for events C and E.
Consider the conditional
if C = 0; then E = 0
This conditional may be true; if so, C is a cause of E. Suppose instead that it is false. Then C is a cause
of E iff there is a reduction of the actual situation according to which C and E still occur, and in which
this conditional is true.
Rather than speaking of fewer events occuring, in this definition Hall characterizes a reduction in terms of whether
or not variables retain their actual value. This is because in the context of neuron diagrams, an event is the firing of a
neuron, which is represented by a variable taking on its deviant value, i.e., the variable becoming true. In the dynamic
context of CP-logic, the formal object that corresponds most naturally to Hall’s informal concept of an event is the
transition in a probability tree (i.e., the application of a causal law) that makes such a variable true. Therefore we take
a reduction to mean that no law is applied such that it makes a variable true that did not become true in the actual
setting.
To make this more precise, we introduce some new formal terminology. Let d be a branch of a probability tree of
the theory T . Lawsd denotes the set of all laws that were applied in d. The resulting effect of the application of a law
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Figure 5: Probability tree with a non-simple story.
r ∈ Lawsd – i.e., the disjunct of the head which was chosen – will be denoted by rd , or by 0 if an empty disjunct was
chosen. The set of true variables in the leaf of d will be denoted by Lea fd .
A branch d is a reduction of b iff ∀r ∈ Lawsd : rd = 0∨∃s ∈ Lawsb : rd = sb. Or, equivalently, Lea fd ⊆ Lea fb.
A reduction of b in which both C and E occur – i.e., hold in its leaf – will be called a (C,E)-reduction. The set of
all of these will be denoted by Red(C,E)b . These are precisely the branches which are relevant for Hall’s definition.
Definition 3. We define that C is an actual cause of E iff (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C))> 0).
Theorem 3 shows the correctness of our translation. Proofs of all theorems can be found in the Appendices.
Theorem 3. Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its variables V.
Consider the CP-logic theory T and story b that we get when applying the translation from Section 3.3.1. Then C is
an actual cause of E in the diagram according to Hall’s definition iff C is an actual cause of E in b and T according
to Definition 3.
At first sight, Definition 3 does not fit into the general framework we introduced earlier, because of the quantifier
over different branches. However, we will now show that for a significant group of cases it actually suffices to consider
just a single T ∗, which can be described in terms of irrelevant and intrinsic laws.
Rather than looking at all of the reductions separately, we single out a minimal structure which contains the essence
of our story. This structure will be based on the set of all laws that are necessary for a reduction, in the sense that they
happen in each reduction and that, moreover, they always happen in the same way, i.e., with the same outcome.
Definition 4. A law r is necessary iff
• ∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b : r ∈ Lawsd and
• ∀d,e ∈ Red(C,E)b : rd = re.
We define Nec(b) as the set of all necessary laws.
In general it might be that there are two (or more) laws which are unnecessary by themselves, but at least one of
them has to be applied as it was in b. Consider for example the following CP-theory.
C← . (A : p)←C.
(B : q)←C.
E← A.
E← B.
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In the story where C causes both A and B, each of those being sufficient for E, neither the second nor the third law
is necessary for E. Yet it is clear that at least one of them has to be applied to get E. In cases where this complication
does not arise, we shall say that the story is simple.
First, some helpful terminology: an r-variant of a branch b is any branch b′ which coincides with b up to the
application of r, but which then selects a different atom rb′ , rb from the head of r. Note that if r is deterministic,
there are no r-variants.
Definition 5. A story b is simple iff the following holds:
• ∀r ∈ Lawsb : the head of r contains at most two disjuncts;
• ∀d ∈ Red(C,E)b , for all non-deterministic r ∈ Lawsd \Nec(b) : ∃e ∈ Red(C,E)b so that e is an r-variant of d.
We illustrate this concept by looking at a probability tree for the previous example in Figure 5, to show that the
previous story is not simple. The left-most branch is a formal counterpart of this story. Except for the right-most
branch in which E is false, all branches are (C,E)-reductions of b. To see that the second law r is not necessary,
observe that for any branch d in the left-side of the tree, rd = A, whereas for any branch e in the right-side, re = 0.
Similarly, the third law is not necessary either.
Now consider the second branch from the right, d, and the third law, r′, that results in B in the fourth node: there
does not exist a (C,E)-reduction e of b that is identical to d up to the third node (i.e., up to the application of r′), but
different regarding the fourth node (i.e., B = r′d , r
′
e). Hence, b is not simple.
We are now in a position to formulate a theorem that will allow us to adjust Hall’s definition into our framework.
Theorem 4. If (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C))> 0) then PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C))> 0. If b is simple, then the reverse
implication holds as well.
It is possible to add an additional criterion to turn this theorem into an equivalence that also holds for non-simple
stories. We choose not to do this, because all of the examples Hall discusses are simple, as are all of the classical
examples discussed in the literarure, such as Early and Late Preemption, Symmetric Overdetermination, Switches,
etc.
As a result of this theorem, rather than having to look at all (C,E)-reductions and calculate their associated
probabilities, we need only find all the necessary laws and calculate a single probability. If the story b is simple,
then this probability represents an extension of Hall’s definition, since they are equivalent if one ignores the value
of the probability but for it being 0 or not. To obtain a workable definition of actual causation, we present a more
constructive description of necessary laws.
Theorem 5. If b is simple, then a non-deterministic law r is necessary iff none of the r-variants of b is a (C,E)-
reduction.
With this result, we can finally formulate our version of Hall’s definition, which we will refer to as Hall07.
Hall07-Irrelevant. No law r is irrelevant.
Hall07-Intrinsic. A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b, and none of the r-variants d of b is such that {C,E} ⊆
Lea fd ⊆ Lea fb.
3.4. Hall 2004 Definitions
Hall (2004) claims that it is impossible to account for the wide variety of examples in which we intuitively judge
there to be actual causation by using a single, all-encompassing definition. Therefore he defines two different concepts
which both deserve to be called forms of causation but are nonetheless not co-extensive.
3.4.1. Dependence
The first of these is simply Dependence, as stated in Definition 1. As mentioned earlier, Hall only considers
deterministic causal relations, and thus the probabilistic counterfactual will either be 1 or 0.
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3.4.2. Production
The second concept tries to express the idea that to cause something is to bring it about, or to produce it. The
original, rather technical, definition can be found in the appendices, but the following informal version suffices for
our purposes: C is a producer of E iff there is a directed path of firing neurons in the diagram from C to E. In our
framework, this translates to the following.
Production-Irr. A law r is irrelevant iff r was not applied before E in b, or if its effect was already true when it was
applied.
Production-Intr. A law r is intrinsic iff r was applied in b.
Theorem 6. Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its variables V.
Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the translation from Section 3.3.1. C is a
producer of E in the diagram according to Hall iff C is an actual cause of E given Production-Irr and Production-Intr.
Besides providing a probabilistic extension, the CP-logic version of production also offers a way to make sense of
causation by omission. That is, just as with all of the definitions in our framework in fact, we can extend it to allow
negative literals such as ¬C to be causes as well.
4. Comparison
Table 1 presents a schematic overview of the four definitions we have discussed. The columns and rows give the
criteria for a law r of T to be considered intrinsic, respectively irrelevant, in relation to a story b, and an event E. By
r ≤b E, we denote that r was applied in b before E occurred.
Table 1: Spectrum of definitions
Irrelevant Intrinsic
r ∈ Lawsb r ∈ Nec(b)
/0 Dependence Hall07
∃d : (d = b up to E)∧ r ≥d E BV12
r ≮b E ∨ rb <b r Production
Looking at this table, we can informally characterise the different definitions by describing which events are
allowed to happen in the counterfactual worlds they take into consideration to judge causation:
• Production: Only those events – i.e., applications of laws making a variable true – which happened before E,
and not differently – i.e., with the same outcome as in the actual story.
• BV12: Those events which happened before E, and not differently, and also those events which were prevented
from happening by these.
• Hall07: All events, as long as those events that were necessary to E do not happen differently.
• Dependence: All events, as long as those events that did actually happen do not happen differently.
In order to illustrate the working of the definitions and their differences, we present an example:
Example 3. Assassin decides to poison the meal of a victim, who subsequently Dies right before dessert. However,
Murderer decided to murder the victim as well, so he poisoned the dessert. If Assassin had failed to do his job, then
Backup probably would have done so all the same.
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The causal laws that form the background to this story are give by the following theory:
(Assassin : p)← .
(Murderer : q)← .
(Backup : r)←¬Assassin.
Dies← Assassin.
Dies← Backup.
Dies←Murderer.
In this story, did Assassin cause Dies? We leave it to the reader to verify that in this case the left intrinsicness
condition from the table applies to the first two non-deterministic laws, whereas the right one only applies to the first.
The second irrelevance condition only applies to the last law, whereas the third one applies to the last two laws and to
the third. This results in the following probabilities representing the causal status of Assassin:
Production BV12 Hall07 Dependence
1 1− r (1− r)∗ (1−q) 0
Hence Assassin is a full cause according to Production, not a cause at all according to Dependence, and somewhere
in between these two extremes according to the other two definitions.
Intuitively, most people would judge Assassin to be fully responsible for causing victim’s death. Hence this par-
ticular example seems to speak in favour of Production. However, note that this example is clearly set in a normative
context, since murdering people is – in almost all cases – judged to be wrong. One can easily come up with morally
neutral examples using these CP-laws and the same story such that our intuitions would be different, for instance the
following story:
Example 4. Billy has set the alarm for six o’clock, at which time it goes off, so that he and Suzy make it in time to
school. However, Suzy had put her alarm for five past six, which would have also left ample amount of time. If Billy
had failed to put his alarm, then Mother probably have done so all the same.
In this story, it sounds quite reasonable to say that Billy is not a full cause of Billy and Suzy making it to school
on time. We deliberately first chose an example that contains normative elements, because it is a general feature of
all existing definitions of causation that they fail to do justice to such context-dependency. We now turn to the second
goal of this paper: to incorporate the influence of norms into judgments of actual causation.
5. The HH Extension to Actual Causation
In this section we succinctly present the graded, context-dependent approach to actual causation from (Halpern
and Hitchcock, 2015). We will use the following story from (Knobe and Fraser, 2008) as our running example, as it
illustrates the influence normative considerations can have on our causal attributions:
Example 5. The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The administrative
assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members are supposed to buy their own. The administrative assistants
typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist repeatedly e-mailed them
reminders that only administrators are allowed to take the pens. On Monday morning, one of the administrative assis-
tants encounters professor Smith walking past the receptionists desk. Both take pens. Later, that day, the receptionist
needs to take an important message...but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk.
We formally represent the relevant events on the Monday morning from our running example using CP-logic. The
domain consists of the variables Pro f and Assistant, which stand for the professor respectively the assistant taking a
pen, and NoPens, which is true when there are no pens left. The causal structure can be represented by the following
CP-theory T :
(Pro f : 0.7)← . (5)
(Assistant : 0.8)← . (6)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (7)
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Figure 6: Probability tree for the Pen-vignette.
The given theory summarizes all possible stories that can take place in this model. One of those is what in fact
did happen that Monday morning: both the professor and the assistant take a pen, leaving the receptionist faced with
no pens. The other stories consist in only the professor taking a pen, only the assistant doing so, or neither, as can be
seen in the probability tree in Figure 6. The leftmost branch is the formal counterpart of the above story.
As with much work on actual causation, HH frame their ideas using structural equation modelling. As mentioned
earlier, such a model consists of a set of equations, one for each endogenous variable, that express the functional
dependencies of the endogenous variables on others. As before, these models contain two types of (boolean) endoge-
nous variables: the ones that deterministically depend on other endogenous variables, and those that depend directly
on exogenous variables.
HH take a world to be an assignment to all endogenous variables. Given a structural model, each assignment u to
the exogenous variables determines a unique world, denoted by su.
An extended structural model (M,) consists of a structural model M together with a normality ranking  over
worlds. This ranking is a partial pre-order informed by our – possibly subjective – judgments about what we take to
be normal in this context. It is derived by considering the typicality of the values of the variables in each world. A
world s is more normal than s′ if there is at least one variable that takes a more typical value in s than it does in s′, and
no variable takes a less typical value. For the variables that depend only on other endogenous variables, things are
straightforward: it is typical that these variables take the value dictated by their deterministic equation. For the other
variables, i.e., those that depend only on the exogenous variables, a typicality ranking over their possible values has
to be provided by the modeller.
Typicality and normality are meant to encompass both statistical and normative judgments. Although HH make
no syntactic distinction between the two kinds of normality, in the examples discussed they do differentiate between
them informally. By contrast, we will make a formal distinction between the two, because in this manner we can
incorporate information regarding both.
Say we have a story, i.e., an assignment to all variables, such that C and E happen in it. In order to establish whether
C is a cause of E, any definition in the counterfactual tradition restricts itself to some particular set of counterfactual
worlds in which ¬C holds and checks whether also ¬E holds in these worlds. If this set contains a world which serves
to justify that C is indeed a cause of E (i.e., one in which E is false), then HH call such a world a witness of this. HH
adapt a given definition of actual causation using the normality ranking to disallow worlds that are less normal than
the actual world, in order to reflect the influence of normality on possible causes.
Definition 6. [HH-extension of actual causation.] Given are an extended structural model (M,) and exogenous
assignment u, such that both C and E hold in su. C is an HH-actual cause of E in (M,,u) iff C is an actual cause of
E in (M,u) when we consider only witnesses w such that w su.
Since we have a ranking on the normality of worlds, this definition straightforwardly leads to an ordering between
different causes indicating the strength of the causal relationship by looking at the highest ranked witness for a cause,
which is called its best witness.
In case of our example, we get that
{¬Pro f ,Assistant,¬NoPens}  {Pro f ,Assistant,NoPens}  {Pro f ,¬Assistant,¬NoPens}
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Since the actual world is in the middle, the first of these can serve as a witness for Pro f being a cause, but the last
may not be used to judge Assistant to be a cause.
6. The HH Extension in CP-logic
We proceed with translating the HH-extension of actual causation into CP-logic. To get there, we will translate
one by one all of the required concepts.
HH use the HP-definition (Halpern and Pearl, 2005a) as their working definition to illustrate their extension to
actual causation. However, they stress the generality of their approach, and mention that one could for example apply
it to Hall’s definition (2007), which we reformulated as an instantation of our general definition in Section 3.3. To
keep things simple, we will use Dependence as our definition of actual causation throughout the examples, and thus
take T ∗ to simply be T b. Note however that our approach can be applied to any instantiation of our general framework.
A structural model M in the HH-setting corresponds to a CP-theory T : a direct dependency on the exogenous
variables results in a non-deterministic, vacuous law (such as (5) and (6)), while a dependency on only endogenous
variables results in a deterministic law (such as (7)).
A world s described by M then corresponds to a branch b – or to be more precise, the leaf of a branch – of a
probability tree of T . In Definition 6, we restricted attention to those worlds that are at least as normal as the actual
world. The CP-logic-equivalent of this will be the normal refinement of T according to b, which is a theory that
describes those stories which are at least as normal as b.
First we introduce two operations on CP-laws, corresponding to the two different interpretations of normality.
Assume at some point a CP-law r was applied in b, choosing the disjunct rb that occurs in its head.
On a probabilistic reading, an alternative application of r is at least as normal as the actual one if a disjunct is
chosen which is at least as likely as rb. Therefore the probabilistically normalized refinement of r according to b –
denoted by rPN(b) – consists in r without all disjuncts that have a strictly smaller probability than rb. Remain the laws
that were not applied in b. In line with the understanding of normality from HH, we choose to handle these such that
they cannot have effects which result in a world less normal than the actual world. Thus we remove those disjuncts
that are false in the leaf of b and have a probability lower than 0.5. Further, say the total probability of the removed
disjuncts in some law is p, then we renormalize the remaining probabilities by dividing by 1− p. (Unless p = 1, then
we simply remove the law.)
Definition 7. Given a theory T , and a story b, we define the probabilistically normalized refinement of T according
to b as T PN(b) := {rPN(b)|r ∈ T}.
In case of our example, T PN(b) = T b, shown earlier.
A second reading of normality considers not what did or could happen, but what ought to happen. To allow such
considerations, we extend CP-logic with norms. Everything that can possibly happen is described by the CP-laws of
a theory, hence we choose to introduce prescriptive norms in addition to descriptive CP-laws. These take the form of
alternative probabilities for the disjuncts in the head of a law, which represent how the law should behave. (A more
general approach could be imagined, but for the present purpose this extension will suffice.) These probabilities will
be enclosed in curly braces, and have no influence on the actual behaviour of a theory. However, if we wish to look
at how the world should behave, we can enforce the norms by replacing the original probabilities of a theory T with
the normative ones. For example, extending law (5) with the norm that the professor shouldn’t take pens, even though
he often does, gives (Pro f : 0.7{0})←. The normatively normalized refinement – denoted by rNN(b) – is then given
by the CP-law (Pro f : 0)←. To properly capture the HH definition, our normalized theory should allow all worlds
that are at least as normal as b, including of course b itself. For this reason, we here restrict attention to norms with
a probability p so that 0 < p < 1, because a norm p = 0 or p = 1 could make the actual world b impossible. This
restriction is lifted in our own proposal in Section 8.1. In the meanwhile we shall use (Pro f : 0.7{p})←, where p is
some small probability, e.g., 0.01.
Definition 8. Given an extended theory T , i.e., a theory also containing norms, we define the normatively normalized
refinement of T as T NN := {rNN |r ∈ T}.
We can combine both senses of normality, as follows:
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Definition 9. Given an extended theory T , and a story b, we define the normal refinement of T according to b as
T Normal(b) := (T NN)PN(b).
The normal refinement according to b is constructed out of T by eliminating all the disjuncts with values of
variables that are less normal (either probabilistically or normatively) than the values from b, and thus it allows
precisely those stories which are at least as normal as b.6 In case of our example, T Normal(b) is given by:
(Pro f : p)← . (8)
Assistant← . (9)
NoPens← Pro f ∧Assistant. (10)
To be able to prove that this is indeed the same as HH, we still need to explain how we get from a given extended
structural model to an extended CP-theory. The normality ranking is derived by considering what is typical for those
variables depending directly on the exogenous variables, i.e., those that we represent by X : p←. HH use statements
that take the form: “it is typical for the variable X to be true”, or “it is typical for it to be false”. In CP-logic this
becomes: p > 0.5, and p < 0.5 respectively. A statement of the form: “it is more typical for X to be true than for
Y to be true” translates in an ordering on the respective probabilities. If the typicality statement is of the normative
kind, then it is best represented by norms in CP-logic. Thus if there is a norm regarding X then the law will take the
extended form X : p{q}←.
In Definition 6, we have that a world is an acceptable witness only if it belongs to the set of worlds allowed by
the definition of actual causation that is being used, and it is at least as normal as the actual world. Similarly, we
need to limit the stories allowed by Definition 2 – which are described by T ∗|do(¬C) – to those stories which are
at least as normal as b. We would like to do this in exactly the same manner as we did for T , i.e., by looking at
(T ∗|do(¬C))Normal(b). However, by applying the intervention do(¬C), which removes C from the head of any law in
T in which it appears, we lose all information on the (ab)normality of ¬C. As this information should be taken into
account as well, we work with the normal refinement of these laws instead. Concretely, denote by R(C) those laws
from T which have C in their head. We denote by T ∗∗ the theory identical to T ∗|do(¬C) except that it contains the
normal refinements of all laws in R(C). This complication disappears when we consider our improvement to the HH
approach further on.
Definition 10. Given an extended theory T , a story b such that C and E hold in its leaf, and the theory T ∗ as described
in Definition 2. We define the normal refinement of T ∗ according to b and C as T Normal(b)∗ := (T ∗∗)Normal(b).
This leads us to the following formulation of the HH-approach in CP-logic.
Definition 11. [HH-CP-logic-extension of actual causation] Given an extended theory T , and a branch b such that
both C and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an HH-CP-logic-actual cause of E in (T,b) iff PT Normal(b)∗(¬E∧¬C)>
0.
For C = Assistant, the probabilistic normalisation of T ∗∗ replaces (Assistant : 0.8)← with the deterministic law
Assistant←, leading to P(¬NoPens∧¬Assistant) = 0. On the other hand, for C = Pro f , the normative normalisation
replaces (Pro f : 0.7{p})← with (Pro f : p)←, leading to P(¬NoPens∧¬Pro f ) = 1− p. Thus Pro f is judged to be
a strong cause of NoPens, whereas Assistant isn’t a cause at all, in line with the empirical results from (Knobe and
Fraser, 2008). Note that it is only by using the normative probabilities rather than the statistical ones that we get the
correct response for Pro f .
In Section 3.1 we gave a general definition of actual causation in terms of CP-logic. In order to finish the translation
from extended structural models to extended CP-logic, we assume that the definition of actual causation being used
is such that just as the three definitions from Hall discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, it can be translated from structural
models into the framework of our general definition. We now show that Definition 11 is indeed the correct translation
of the HH approach from structural models to CP-logic.
Theorem 7. C is an HH-actual cause of E in an extended model and exogenous assignment (M,,u) iff C is an
HH-CP-logic-actual cause of E in (T,b), where (T,b) is derived from (M,,u) in the sense described above.
6A formal proof of this can be found in the Appendices, as Lemma 2.
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7. The Importance of Counterfactuals
We mentioned earlier that one criterion for a story to be normal was that it respects the laws/equations. On
the other hand definitions of actual causation look at counterfactual stories resulting from an intervention, namely
do(¬C), which violates the laws. Following HH, Definition 11 tries to circumvent the use of this intervention by only
allowing witnesses in which ¬C happens to hold. However, it may be the case that this condition actually eliminates
all potential witnesses. When this happens, counterintuitive results may follow. We illustrate what goes wrong by
using the following theory:
(A : 0.1)← .
C← A.
E←C.
E←¬A.
Consider the story where first A occurs, followed by C and E. Intuitively, C is a strong cause of E, because it is
an atypical phenomenon (P(C) = 0.1) without which E would not have occured. The law with A in its head is
intrinsic, and thus T Normal(b)∗ is:
A← .
C← A.
E←C.
E←¬A.
Applying the definition, we get that PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧¬C) = 0, giving the absurd result that C is not a cause of E
at all. The problem lies in the fact that in its current form we only allow stories containing ¬C in the usual, lawful
way, rather than stories which contain ¬C as a result of the intervention do(¬C). The problem remains if we use the
HP-definition – as HH does – instead of our working definition.
We can set this straight by looking instead at PT Normal(b)∗(¬E|do(¬C)), so that we re-establish the counterfactual na-
ture of our definition. (As T ∗∗|do(¬C) = T ∗|do(¬C), this is equivalent to P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C)), which no longer
mentions the artificial theory T ∗∗.) However, by making this move we no longer take into account the (ab)normality
of C itself, whereas research shows extensively that causal judgments regarding an event are often influenced by how
normal it was (Kahneman, 1986; Knobe and Fraser, 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009). (This effect is not limited
to normative contexts. For example, the lighting of a match is usually judged a cause of a fire, whereas the presence
of oxygen is considered so normal that it isn’t.) Hence we should factor in this normality, which is expressed by
PT Normal(b)(¬C).
Definition 12. [First refinement of Definition 11] Given an extended theory T , and a branch b such that both C and
E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause of E in (T,b) iff P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0.
As the following theorem shows, our new choice only makes a difference in a limited set of cases.
Theorem 8. If R(C) contains a non-deterministic law or PT Normal(b)(¬C) = 0, then
PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧¬C) = P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)
If there is a deterministic r ∈ R(C) and PT Normal(b)(¬C) > 0, as in the example shown, then contrary to the left-
hand side of the equation, the proposed adjustment on the right-hand side of the equation gives the desired result
1∗0.9 = 0.9.
8. The Importance of Probabilities
Because the HH-approach lacks the quantification of normality offered by probabilities, they dismiss entirely all
witnesses that are less normal than the actual world. A direct consequence is that any typical event – i.e., P > 0.5 –
is never a cause, which is quite radical. By using probabilities, this qualitative criterion is no longer necessary: less
normal witnesses simply influence our causal judgment less. Further, HH order causes solely by looking at the best
witnesses. We now present an example which illustrates the benefit of both abandoning their criterion, and aggregating
the normality of witnesses to order causes, without sacrificing the influence of normality.
16
Imagine you enter a contest. If a 10-sided die lands 1, you win a car. If not, you get a 100 more throws.
If all of them land higher than 1, then you also win the car. The first throw lands 1, and you win the car.
It’s hard to imagine anyone objecting to the judgment that the first throw is a cause of you winning the car. Yet
that is exactly what we get when applying either Definition 11 or the improved Definition 12. The following theory T
describes the set-up of the contest, where T hrow(i, j) means that the i-th throw landed j or smaller.
(T hrow(1,1) : 0.1)← .
(T hrow(2,1) : 0.1)←¬T hrow(1,1).
(T hrow(3,1) : 0.1)←¬T hrow(1,1)∧¬T hrow(2,1).
...
WinCar← T hrow(1,1).
WinCar←¬T hrow(2,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1).
The normal refinement of T according to the story is given by:
(T hrow(1,1) : 0.1)← .
WinCar← T hrow(1,1).
WinCar←¬T hrow(2,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1).
We get that P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬WinCar|do(¬T hrows(1,1))) = 0, and thus T hrows(1,1) is not a cause of WinCar. In
terms of HH: although ¬T hrow(1,1)∧¬T hrow(2,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1)∧WinCar, is very unlikely, it is the only
candidate witness. To see why, recall that a witness needs to have ¬T hrows(1,1), and should be at least as normal
as the actual world. In every other world with ¬T hrows(1,1), at least one of the T hrows(i,1) is true, and hence it is
less normal. But in a witness it should hold that ¬WinCar, so there is no witness for T hrows(1,1) being a cause of
WinCar.
We can fix this problem by considering the theory (T ∗)NN instead of (T ∗)Normal(b). This leads us to another
refinement of our original definition:
Definition 13. [Second refinement of Definition 11] Given an extended theory T , and a branch b such that both C
and E hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause of E in (T,b) iff P(T ∗)NN (¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0.
The theory (T ∗)NN in this case is simply equal to T , but for the first law being T hrow(1,1) ←. Hence the
probability of not winning the car given that the first throw does not land 1 is pretty much 1, and the value in the
equation becomes approximately 0.9, indicating T hrow(1,1) to be a very strong cause of WinCar.
Note that we only obtain this high value because the probability P(T ∗)NN aggregates the probabilities of all wit-
nesses. If we would instead follow HH in considering only the best witness (in this case the story with ¬T hrow(1,1)∧
T hrow(2,1)∧¬T hrow(3,1)∧ ...∧¬T hrow(100,1)), we would obtain the much lower and less intuitive probability
of 0.09.
Now imagine the same story, with a slight variation to the rules of the contest: you win the car on the first throw
if the die lands anything under 7. Hence the first head changes to T hrow(1,6) : 0.6, making it a typical outcome.
Therefore the first law becomes deterministic in T PN(b), giving that PT Normal(b)(¬T hrow(1,6)) = 0, which again results
in the counterintuitive judgment that the first throw in no way caused you to win the car.
We therefore suggest to use T NN in the second factor of the inequality rather than T Normal(b), making use of the
gradual measurement offered by probabilities. Applying this idea to the example, we get the result that T hrow(1,6)
has causal strength 0.4. This value is smaller than before, because the cause is now less atypical.
8.1. The final definition
This brings us to our final extension to a definition of actual causation.
Definition 14 (Extension of actual causation). Given an extended theory T , and a branch b such that both C and E
hold in its leaf. We define that C is an actual cause of E in (T,b) if and only if P(T ∗)NN (¬E|do(¬C))∗PT NN (¬C)> 0.
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9. Conclusion and Related Work
In this paper we have used the formal language of CP-logic to formulate a general definition of actual causation,
which we used to express four specific definitions: a previous proposal of our own, and three definitions based on
the work of Hall. By moving from the deterministic context of neuron diagrams to the non-deterministic context of
CP-logic, the latter definitions improve on the original ones in two ways: they can deal with a wider class of examples,
and they allow for a graded judgment of actual causation in the form of a conditional probability. Also, comparison
between the definitions is facilitated by presenting them as various ways of filling in two central concepts.
As mentioned, many other definitions exist in the counterfactual tradition. Rather than arguing for or against a
particular definition, our aim in the first part of this work was to develop a general parametrised definition as a tool
for constructing, comparing, and modifying different definitions in a systematic way. We briefly discuss some other
definitions in order to understand the relation of our work to that of others.
The most influential definition of actual causation to date is the HP definition of Halpern and Pearl (2005a). This
definition is expressed using structural equations as they are developed by Pearl (2000). Despite – or because of – its
popularity, it has been subjected to much criticism. Restricting ourselves to authors working within the counterfactual
tradition in the spirit of Lewis (1973), we can divide the criticism into two types.
The first type criticises not just the HP definition itself, but also its formulation in terms of structural equations. We
already mentioned Hall (2007) as a prominent example. In previous work we have also criticised the HP definition and
structural equations in general (Beckers and Vennekens, 2012; Vennekens, 2011). The current paper is a continuation
of both lines of work. While structural equations are useful for a variety of purposes, we feel they lack certain key
features when it comes to actual causation, which are present in CP-logic: true non-determinism in the endogenous
part of the model, the distinction between default and deviant values, and a temporal semantics. It is possible to extend
the language of structural models in various ways to incorporate such features (see, e.g., (Halpern and Pearl, 2005a;
Hitchcock, 2007; Fenton-Glynn, 2015)), or to change the representation of specific examples in such a way that the
need for them is avoided. Nevertheless, we feel that the fact that all of these features are integrated into CP-logic in a
natural way makes the latter a suitable language for the study of actual causation.
In this paper we have exploited this fact by developing a general framework for actual causation in the context
of CP-logic. The essence of this framework lies in the concepts of Intrinsicness and Irrelevance on the one hand,
and the extension to actual causation on the other (Definitions 2 and 14). While similar concepts could be defined
in the context of structural models, their definition is much more straightforward in the temporal, non-deteministic
semantics of CP-logic.
The second type of criticism claims that although the HP definition is on the right track, it requires some adjust-
ments in order to handle certain convincing counterexamples. As a result, several authors have proposed definitions
using structural equations that are variants of the HP definition (Woodward, 2003; Hitchcock, 2001, 2007; Weslake,
2015; Halpern, 2015). Weslake (2015) offers an insightful comparison of several of these variants, concluding that
none of them succeed in dealing with all counterexamples in a satisfactory manner. Although we have refrained
from discussing many examples, both the BV12 and the Hall07 definition fare better on most of these problematic
examples than the definitions mentioned. For completeness, we should also mention that Hitchcock (2009) proposes
several counterexamples to Hall’s definition.
The basic idea behind the HP definition and its variants formulated using structural equations is very similar
to the idea behind our general definition formulated using CP-logic: construct variations of the causal model using
information from the actual story, and check if there is counterfactual dependence of the effect on the candidate cause
in one of these variations. Besides the use of different formal languages, the difference between both approaches
is twofold. First, we use probabilities to quantify the importance of causes. This proved particularly helpful in our
discussion of an extension to actual causation. The second, more fundamental, difference lies in the methodology of
constructing variations of a causal model.
The HP-like definitions construct variations using so-called structural contingencies. A structural contingency is
some set of interventions on a structural model. Different approaches differ in which structural contingencies they
allow. Typically, no principled account is given of why certain structural contingencies should be allowed or not.
Instead, this is decided in an ad hoc manner, based on whether allowing them provides the right answer for certain
problematic examples. Comparisons between different approach are therefore typically also reduced to a tally of
(in-)correctly handled examples.
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As we have seen, in our approach on the other hand, the construction of variations is determined by the Intrinsic-
ness and Irrelevance functions. Therefore different instantiations of our general definition can be compared directly,
and can be defended by means of principled arguments in favour of particular definitions for these functions. Given
the overwhelming amount of problematic examples and the conflicting intuitions that come with them, we believe a
systematic approach to defining actual causation is the right way forward.
In the second part of this work, we showed how our general definition lends itself to an extension of actual
causation that continues upon the work of Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). It incorporates the main points raised by
Halpern and Hitchcock: (1) it allows normative considerations and (2) is able to factor in the normality of the cause
given the context. This extension is useful in normative disciplines, such as law and ethics, and takes into account the
context sensitivity of causal judgements suggested by recent findings in experimental psychology (Knobe and Fraser,
2008; Moore, 2009; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009). Our account improves on the HH account in several ways:
• By using CP-logic our account can also be applied to non-deterministic examples.
• Separating normative from statistical normality allows for a more accurate description of the domain.
• Since we no longer refer to the actual world in the second factor, we can use strict norms.
• The reader may verify that our approach is able to deal with all of the examples given by Halpern and Hitchcock
(2015) equally well as Definition 11.
• It can also properly handle the examples from Sections 7 and 8, as opposed to Definition 11.
Appendix A.
To facilitate the proof of the first theorem, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a neuron diagram D with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its variables V .
Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the translation from Section 3.3.1. Then a
neuron diagram R is a reduction of D in which both C and E occur iff its translation d – another branch of T – is a
(C,E)-reduction of b.
Proof. Assume we have a reduction R of a neuron diagram D, and b is the story corresponding to D. As R is simply
a different assignment to the variables occurring in D, brought about by the same equations that existed for D, this
reduction corresponds to another branch d of T , in which C and E hold in its leaf. Moreover, R can be constructed
starting from D by changing some of the exogenous variables, say U′, from their actual values to their default value,
and then updating the endogenous variables in accordance with the deterministic equations. It being a reduction, this
caused no new variables to take on their deviant value in comparison to D. Let r be a law that occurs in d.
If r is non-deterministic, it must be one of the laws representing a variable V that is determined directly by the
exogenous variables, i.e., a law with an empty body, and hence it was also applied in b. R being a reduction, either
V has the same value in R as in the original diagram, or it has its default value. In the former case, this means that
rd = rb, in the latter case rd = 0, both of which satisfy the requirement for d being a reduction.
If r is deterministic, the precondition for r has to be fulfilled in d, causing some variable V to take on its deviant
value. The same must hold true of the precondition for the equation for V , and thus V takes on its deviant value in R
as well, implying it did so in D too. Therefore there must have been some law applied in b that made V take on its
deviant value as well. From this it follows that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b.
Now assume we have a theory T and a story b that form the translation of a neuron diagram D and the states of
its neurons, such that C and E hold in b, and that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b. As the leaf of d contains an assignment
to all of the variables that satisfies the equations of M, there is a neuron diagram R that corresponds to d. We can
easily go over all the previous steps in the other direction, to conclude that R is a reduction of D in which C and E are
true.
Theorem 3. Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its variables V.
Consider the CP-logic theory T and story b that we get when applying the translation from Section 3.3.1. Then C is
an actual cause of E in the diagram according to Hall’s definition iff C is an actual cause of E in b and T according
to Definition 3.
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Proof. We start with the implication from left to right. Assume we have a neuron diagram D, in which both C and
E fire. This translates into a theory T and a story b, for which C and E hold in its leaf. Further, assume there is a
reduction R of this diagram, in which both C and E continue to hold, and in this reduction, if C = 0; then E = 0. By
the above lemma, this translates into a (C,E)-reduction of b, say d.
In R, if C = 0; then E = 0. The conditional C = 0 is interpreted as a counterfactual locution, and corresponds to
do(¬C). As there are no non-deterministic laws with non-empty preconditions, T d is simply the deterministic theory
that determines the same assignment as R, meaning PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) = 1, which concludes this part of the proof.
Now assume we have a theory T and a story b that form the translation of a neuron diagram D, such that C and
E hold in b, and that d is a (C,E)-reduction of b for which the given inequality holds. By the above lemma, the
translation of d, say R, is reduction of D in which C and E occur. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, T d simply
corresponds to an assignment of values to the variables occurring in D that follows its equations. Since R describes
this same assignment, in R too if C = 0; then E = 0. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. If (∃d ∈ Red(C,E)b : PT d (¬E|do(¬C))> 0) then PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C))> 0. If b is simple, then the reverse
implication holds as well.
Proof. We start with proving the first implication. Assume we have a d ∈ Red(C,E)b such that PT d (¬E|do(¬C)) > 0.
This implies that there is at least one branch e of a probability tree of T d |do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf. We
prove by induction on the length of e that this implies the existence of a similar branch e′ of a probability tree of
T Nec(b)|do(¬C) for which ¬E holds in its leaf, which is what is required to establish the theorem.
Base case: if e consists of a single node – i.e., the root node where all atoms are false – then this means that no
laws of T d |do(¬C) can be applied. Since the bodies of the laws in T Nec(b)|do(¬C) are identical to those of the laws
in T d |do(¬C), we simply have e′ = e.
Induction case: Assume we have a sub-branch en of e with length n > 1, starting from the root node, and that
we also have a structurally identical sub-branch e′n. By it being structurally identical we mean that they are identical
except for the fact that they may have different probabilities along the edges.
If en = e, then no more laws can be applied in the final node of en. This must then hold for the final node of e′n as
well, so we are finished. Otherwise, we know that there is a sub-branch en+1 which extends en along e with a node O.
Assume that the law which was applied to get to O is r.
If r is deterministic, then r occurs in T d |do(¬C) exactly as it does in T Nec(b)|do(¬C). Since both branches are
structurally identical, e′n can be extended in the exact same manner as en, so there has to be a probability tree of
T Nec(b)|do(¬C) in which there is a sub-branch e′n+1 with the desired properties. So assume r is non-deterministic.
First assume r < Lawsd . This implies that r < Nec(b). So as in the deterministic case, r occurs in T d |do(¬C)
exactly as it does in T Nec(b)|do(¬C), and the branch can be extended in the same manner.
Now assume r ∈ Lawsd . If also r ∈ Nec(b), we know that rd = rb = rNec and hence the previous argument holds.
Remains the possibility that r < Nec(b). As in the deterministic case, because r can be applied in the final node of e′n
there has to be a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C) with a sub-branch like e′n where r is applied next.
Assume rd = A. Since A was the outcome of r in d, the law r as it appears in T – and also in T Nec(b)|do(¬C) –
contains A in its head with some probability attached to it. Therefore the final node of e′n in the said probability tree
has one child-node which contains A, extending e′n into a sub-branch e′n+1 with the desired properties. This concludes
this part of the proof.
Now we prove that if b is simple, the reverse implication holds as well.
Assume PT Nec(b)(¬E|do(¬C))> 0. This implies that there is at least one branch e of a probability tree of T Nec(b)|do(¬C)
for which ¬E holds in its leaf. We can repeat the first steps of the previous implication, so that we again arrive at a
law r which was applied to get to a node O.
The branch e′ we are considering occurs in a probability tree of a (C,E)-reduction, say f . First assume r ∈Nec(b).
By definition, this implies that also r ∈ Laws f ∧ rNec = r f , and we can apply the reasoning from above. Likewise as
above, we can apply this reasoning to all other cases, except the one where r < Nec(b), r is non-deterministic, and
r ∈ Laws f . Assume the law r has effect A in the branch e we are considering. If r f = A, then we are back to our
familiar situation, so therefore assume r f = B, and A , B.
Since b is simple, A and B are the only two possible effects of r. Further, remark that r ∈ Lawsb \Nec(b). This
implies the existence of a (C,E)-reduction g that is identical to f up to the application of r, but such that rg , r f , and
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thus rg = A = re meaning there is a branch in a probability tree of g that is structurally identical to e up to O. This
concludes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 5. If b is simple, then a non-deterministic law r is necessary iff none of the r-variants of b is a (C,E)-
reduction.
Proof. We denote the node in b in which r is applied by N. This node has two children, one representing the selection
of rb, and its sibling, say O. Thus, the r-variants of b are all branches passing through O.
We start with the implication from left to right, so we assume r is necessary. Assume rb = A, then there is no
d ∈ Red(C,E)b for which rd , A, hence there is no (C,E)-reduction which passes through O.
Remains the implication from right to left. Assume we have a law r such that there is no (C,E)-reduction passing
through O. We proceed with a reductio ad absurdum, so we assume r is not necessary.
Clearly b is a (C,E)-reduction of itself, and also r ∈ Lawsb \Nec(b). Hence, by b’s simplicity, there is a (C,E)-
reduction e which is identical to b up to the application of r, but for which re , rb. Thus e passes through O,
contradicting the assumption that r is necessary. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 6. Given a neuron diagram with its corresponding equations M, and an assignment to its variables V.
Consider the CP-logic theory T , and a story b, that we get when applying the translation from Section 3.3.1. C is a
producer of E in the diagram according to Hall iff C is an actual cause of E given Production-Irr and Production-Intr.
Proof. First we need to explain some terminology that Hall uses. A structure is a temporal sequence of sets of
events, which unfold according to the equations of some neuron diagram. A branch, or a sub-branch, would be the
corresponding concept in CP-logic.
Two structures are said to match intrinsically when they are represented in an identical manner. The reason why
Hall uses this term, is because even though we use the same variable for an event occurring in different circumstances,
strictly speaking they are not the same. This is mainly an ontological issue, which need not detain us for our present
purposes.
A set of events S is said to be sufficient for another event E, if the fact that E occurs follows from the causal laws,
together with the premisse that S occurs at some time t, and no other events occur at this time. A set is minimally
sufficient if it is sufficient, and no proper subset is. To understand this, note that the ambiguity of the relation between
an event and the value of a variable that we noted earlier, resurfaces here. In the context of neuron diagrams, events
are temporal, and occur during the time-period that a neuron fires, i.e, becomes true. However, at any later time-point,
the variable corresponding to this neuron will remain to be true, implying that the value of the variable has shifted in
meaning from “the neuron fires” to “the neuron has fired”. Given this interpretation, it is natural to translate Hall’s
notion of an event into CP-logic as the application of a law, making a variable true, as we have done.
A further detail to be cleared out, is that in the context of neuron diagrams there can be simultaneous events, since
multiple neurons can fire at the same time. In CP-logic, in each node only one law is allowed to be applied, hence
this translates to two consecutive edges in a branch. Therefore it is not the case that each node-edge pair in a branch
corresponds to a separate time-point, but rather sets of consecutive pairs – with variable size – do. Given such a set,
then for each variable that was the result of the application of a law belonging to it, it holds that its corresponding
event occurs at the next time-point, corresponding to the next set of nodes further down the branch. All the variables
occuring in the bodies of the laws in this set, represent events that occur during this time-point.
Now we can state the precise definition of production as it occurs in (Hall, 2004, p.25).
We begin as before, by supposing that E occurs at t ′, and that t is an earlier time such that at each time
between t and t ′, there is a unique minimally sufficient set for E. But now we add the requirement that
whenever t0 and t1 are two such times (t0 < t1) and S0 and S1 the corresponding minimally sufficient sets,
then
• for each element of S1, there is at t0 a unique minimally sufficient set; and
• the union of these minimally sufficient sets is S0.
21
...
Given some event E occurring at time t ′ and given some earlier time t, we will say that E has a pure causal
history back to time t just in case there is, at every time between t and t ′, a unique minimally sufficient
set for E, and the collection of these sets meets the two foregoing constraints. We will call the structure
consisting of the members of these sets the “pure causal history” of E, back to time t. We will say that
C is a proximate cause of E just in case C and E belong to some structure of events S for which there is
at least one nomologically possible structure S′ such that (i) S′ intrinsically matches S; and (ii) S′ consists
of an E-duplicate, together with a pure causal history of this E-duplicate back to some earlier time. (In
easy cases, S will itself be the needed duplicate structure.) Production, finally, is defined as the ancestral
[i.e., the transitive closure] of proximate causation.
We will start with the implication from left to right. So assume we have a neuron diagram D, in which C is
a producer of E. Say T is the CP-logic theory that is the translation of the equations of the diagram, and b is
the branch representing the story. We already know that C and E hold in the leaf of b. We need to proof that
PT ∗(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. The theory T ∗ only contains deterministic laws, and no disjunctions, hence all its laws are
of the form: V ← A∧A′ ∧ ...∧¬B∧¬B′, where the number of positive literals in the conjunction is at least one.
Therefore any probability tree for T ∗ consists out of only one branch, determining a unique assignment for all the
variables. Further, even though the theory T may contain several laws in which a variable occurs in the head, because
of our irrelevance criterion T ∗ contains exactly one law for every variable that is true. So for every true variable in this
assignment, there is a unique chain of laws – neglecting the order – which needs to be applied to make this variable
true. For any such variable V , we will say that it depends on all of the variables occurring positively in the body of a
law in this chain. Clearly, if any true variable changes its value in this assignment, then all variables which depend on
it become false.
As a first case, assume C is a proximate cause of E. We start by assuming that circumstances are nice, meaning
that D contains itself a structure S which is a pure causal history of E. This means that in the actual story b, C is part
of a unique minimally sufficient set for E. From this it follows that in T ∗, C figures positively in one of the laws on
which E depends. Hence, if we apply do(¬C), then E will no longer hold.
Now assume that there is a structure S occurring in D, such that there exists another diagram, say D′, in which this
structure occurs as well, and forms a pure causal history of E. This diagram corresponds to a branch of T , say d, That
means that in T ∗d – i.e., the theory T
∗ constructed out d – C occurs positively in the unique chain of laws which can
make E true. But as all events in S also occur in D, at the same moments as they do in D′, that means that C must also
occur positively in the unique chain of laws for E in the theory T ∗b . Hence, E depends on C in the theory T
∗
b as well.
Now look at the more general case, in which C occurs in a chain of proximate causes, that leads up to E. I.e, in
D, C is the proximate cause of some variable V1, which in turn is the proximate cause of some variable V2, and so on
until we get to E. We know from the previous discussion, that this implies in T ∗ that do(¬C) then ¬V1, and do(¬V1)
then ¬V2, and so on. Given what we know about T ∗, it directly follows that when we apply do(¬C), then ¬E. This
concludes this part of the proof.
We continue with the implication from right to left. So assume that we are given again a neuron diagram and a
corresponding story b, and that we know PT ∗(¬E|do(¬C)) > 0. From our earlier analysis of T ∗, we know that this
means that C occurs positively in the unique chain of laws that can make E true according to T ∗. From this chain of
laws, we start from the one causing E and from there pick out a series that gets us to a law where C occurs positively
in the body. More concretely, we take a series of the form: E ← ...A∧ ..., A← ...D∧ ..., and so on until we get at a
law Z← ...C∧ .... By definition of production, it suffices to prove that in this chain, each of the variables in the body
is a proximate cause of the variable in the head.
Take such a law V ← ...W ∧ .... At the time that this law is applied, W clearly is a member of a sufficient set of
events for V , which occurs at the next time point. Say S0 is the set of all events that occur together with W that figure
in the body of this law, and S1 is the set {V} that occurs at the next time-point, then the structure consisting precisely
of S0 and S1 and nothing else forms a pure causal history of V containing W . The same reasoning applies to all laws
of the chain. This concludes the proof.
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Appendix B.
To facilitate the proof of Theorem 7, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given an extended model and exogenous assignment (M,,u), and a theory and branch (T,b) that are
derived from (M,,u) in the sense described in Section 6. Then for any world w, and a branch d of a probability tree
from T that corresponds to it, it holds that w su iff d occurs in a probability tree of T Normal(b).
Proof. We know that b is a branch in a probability tree from T such that Lea fb has the same assignment as su. Recall
that T consists of two categories of laws. First there are those corresponding to the equations for the endogenous
variables which depend on other endogenous variables, which are deterministic and thus re-appear in T Normal(b)
unchanged. Second there are those corresponding to the endogenous variables which directly depend on the exogenous
variables, which take the form X : p{q}←, where the second probability need not be present.
Assume we have a world w such that w su. Any world that satisfies the equations of M follows deterministically
from an assignment to all exogenous variables. As su is a world that satisfies the equations, and w is at least as normal,
it also satisfies the equations. Hence there is an exogenous assignment u′ which determines w. In CP-logic, such an
assignment corresponds to choosing particular disjuncts in the heads of all laws from the second category.
Concretely, this means that for each law/equation of the second category, the value of the corresponding variable X
is at least as typical in w= su′ as it is in su. Denote by Xw and Xs the values X takes in the worlds w and su respectively.
By construction of T Normal(b), the disjuncts which are at least typical as Xs – be it in the statistical or in the normative
sense – still appear in the law for X in T Normal(b), and hence can be chosen when this law is applied. Therefore the
branches corresponding to w from the probability trees of T also appear in the probability trees of T Normal(b), be it
that the values of the probabilities may have changed.
Now assume we have a branch d corresponding to a world w, that occurs in a probability tree of T Normal(b). We
can simply reverse the correspondence between the choices of disjuncts and an exogenous assignment, to obtain that
w su.
Theorem 7. C is an HH-actual cause of E in an extended model and exogenous assignment (M,,u) iff C is an
HH-CP-logic-actual cause of E in (T,b), where (T,b) is derived from (M,,u) in the sense described in Section 6.
Proof. We begin with the implication from left to right. So assume we have an extended model and exogenous
assignment (M,,u), such that C and E hold in su, and there is at least one witness w of C being an actual cause of E
in (M,u) such that w su.
Recall that we assume the definition of actual causation at hand can be translated from structural models into an
instantiation of our general definition. So we get that C is an actual cause of E in (T,b), and more specifically that
any branch d that corresponds to w is a witness of this. Thus d appears in a probability tree of T ∗|do(¬C).
By Lemma 2, we know that such a branch d also appears in a probability tree of T Normal(b).
We look separately at the two options regarding R(C). First we assume that C is determined directly by the
exogenous variables, meaning that R(C) consists of a single non-deterministic law, say r(C). Since d occurs in a tree
of T Normal(b), and ¬C holds in it, the empty disjunct remains present in the normal refinement of r(C). By definition,
T ∗∗ is simply T ∗|do(¬C) with the normal refinement of r(C). Therefore d also occurs in a tree of T ∗∗.
Second, assume the laws in R(C) are deterministic. Since d occurs in a tree of T Normal(b), which obviously contains
C in the head of any law r(C) ∈ R(C), the body for r(C) cannot be satisfied in d. Thus all laws R(C) are irrelevant to
d. Since T ∗∗ and T ∗|do(¬C) are identical but for R(C), we can again conclude that d also occurs in a tree of T ∗∗.
So in all cases we have that d occurs both in a tree of T Normal(b), and in a tree of T ∗∗. This implies that the disjuncts
chosen in the laws applied in d occur in the versions these laws take in both of these theories, with possibly different
but strictly positive probabilities. Note that every law from T Normal(b)∗ either takes the form it has in T ∗∗ or it takes
the form it has in T Normal(b). Therefore d also appears in T Normal(b)∗. It being a witness, ¬C and ¬E hold in it, and
thus the stated probability is strictly positive.
Now we continue with the reverse implication. Assume we have an extended theory T , a story b such that C and
E hold in it, and PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧¬C)> 0. This implies the existence of a branch d in T Normal(b)∗ such that both ¬C
and ¬E holds.
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Say r is a law from T Normal(b)∗. If r is intrinsic and r 3 nR(C), it is deterministic, containing the single (possibly
empty) disjunct rd with associated probability 1. As rd was the actual choice from b, by construction rd also appears
in the normal refinement of r, although the probability may be different. However, as long as we do not have strict
norms, i.e., norms where p or q is 1, this probability will be strictly positive. A strict norm means that a violation of it
is considered entirely abnormal, analogous to the occurrence of an event with zero probability. Since HH treat norms
identical to statistical normality, and since the actual world was possible, it follows that the actual world is not entirely
abnormal. Hence even if rd was a violation of a norm, it will not have been a strict norm. (Our final definition from
Section 8.1 does allow for strict norms.) Thus, we conclude that rd occurs in the head of the versions of the law r we
find in both T ∗ and T Normal(b). Because r 6 R(C), we can say the same about T ∗|do(¬C).
If r is not intrinsic and r < R(C), it contains all of its original disjuncts when it occurs in T ∗. Therefore it takes the
same form in T Normal(b)∗ as it does in T Normal(b). Again we conclude that rd occurs in the head of the versions of the
law r we find in each of T ∗, T Normal(b) and T ∗|do(¬C).
This leaves us to consider the laws in R(C). By definition, T Normal(b)∗ contains the same version of these laws
as T Normal(b). From this and the previous paragraphs we can already conclude that any branch occuring in a tree of
T Normal(b)∗ also occurs in a tree of T Normal(b). More specifically this holds for d. Thus by Lemma 2, it holds for the
corresponding world w that w su.
If the body for each r ∈ R(C) is false in d, then the precise form of the head of r is irrelevant for d. As the head
of each r ∈ R(C) is the only difference between T ∗∗ and T ∗|do(¬C), we can again conclude that d also occurs in
T ∗|do(¬C).
Leaves us to consider the case that there is some r ∈ R(C) for which the body is true in d. From the fact that d –
in which ¬C holds – occurs in T Normal(b), we can infer that r is a non-deterministic law, and thus the only member of
R(C). Taken together with the knowledge that the disjunct containing C was chosen in b, it follows that the normal
refinement of r contains both C and the empty disjunct in its head. Furthermore, in d the empty disjunct was chosen.
These observations taken together imply that the disjunct of r chosen in d occurs in the head of the versions of r we
find in both T ∗∗ and T ∗|do(¬C). Once more we conclude that d also occurs in T ∗|do(¬C).
Thus d is a witness for C being an actual cause of E in (T,b). Therefore the world w corresponding to d is a
witness for C being an actual cause of E in (M,u). Together with the fact that w su, the conclusion follows.
Theorem 8. If R(C) contains a non-deterministic law or PT Normal(b)(¬C) = 0, then
PT Normal(b)∗(¬E ∧¬C) = P(T ∗)Normal(b)(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)
Proof. First we examine the case where PT Normal(b)(¬C) = 0. This implies that the right-hand side of the equation is 0.
Also, any branch from a tree T Normal(b)∗ occurs as well in a tree of T Normal(b), so PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) = 0 and the left-hand
side is also equal to 0.
This leaves us to consider the case where PT Normal(b)(¬C)> 0 and the unique r(C) ∈ R(C) is non-deterministic.
In this case PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) = PT Normal(b)(¬C), so we have:
PT Normal(b)∗(¬E∧¬C) = PT Normal(b)∗(¬E∧¬C)∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)/PT Normal(b)∗(¬C) = PT Normal(b)∗(¬E|¬C)∗PT Normal(b)(¬C)
Further, conditioning on ¬C when C only occurs in a vacuous non-deterministic law, is identical to looking at the
intervention do(¬C), thus the list of equalities continues:
= PT Normal(b)∗(¬E|do(¬C))∗PT Normal(b)(¬C). Also, T Normal(b)∗|do(¬C) = (T ∗)Normal(b)∗|do(¬C), which brings us
to the desired conclusion.
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